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Abstract 
We examine the effects of bank deregulation on the spatial dynamics of retail-bank 
branching, exploiting, much like a quasi-natural experiment, the context of intense 
liberalization reforms in Belgium in the late nineties. Using .ne-grained data on branch 
network dynamics within the metropolitan area of Antwerp and advancing novel spatial 
econometric techniques, we show that these liberalization reforms radically shifted and 
accelerated branch network dynamics. Entry and exit dynamics substantially intensified, the 
level change in financial void grew significantly, and bank choice markedly declined. 
Moreover, all these changes consistently extended (even with greater intensity) after the 
liberalization peak. However, the immediate and longer-term spatial ramifications of the 
financial sector liberalization were very distinct. All immediate changes systematically, 
differentially impacted the poorer and wealthier neighborhoods, disenfranchising the poorer 
neighbourhoods and favoring their wealthier counterparts. The longer-term effects on spatial 
patterns of change no longer exhibited this systematic relationship with neighborhood 
income. We draw out the policy implications of our findings. 
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1 Introduction
The past twenty years have witnessed a dramatic change in the geography of Belgiums retail-
banking landscape. Belgiums branch network shrunk by over forty percent, from more than
8,000 branches in 1985 to less than 5,000 branches in 2004 (Goddard et al., 2007). Consumer
choice over retail banks likewise dwindled during this period. These trends give evidence
of the overall profound retail-banking transformations that swept through Belgium, led by
concurrent liberalization reforms and technological innovations in the nancial sector. But
they do not convey the intensity of change in branch network dynamics over time, nor capture
the remarkable spatial heterogeneity of these changes. Making use of new, unusually ne-
grained data on branch dynamics, this paper revisits the periods before, during and after the
liberalization peak of the late nineties in more detail. It explores the on the grounddistinct
ramications of intense liberalization reforms.
We exploit the context of the metropolitan area of Antwerp in Belgium to make several
contributions to our understanding of retail-banking liberalization, market structure and con-
sumer welfare. We investigate the extent to which the nancial sector restructuring during the
late nineties e¤ectively altered patterns of bank presence, entry and exit, on the ground. Also,
we examine the consumer choice implications of any such changing retail-bank network dy-
namics. Further, we assess the divergences of bank liberalization experience across Antwerps
di¤erent neighbourhoods.
We advance three main empirical results. First, the liberalization reforms and the techno-
logical innovations introduced in the late nineties radically shifted and accelerated the retail-
branch network dynamics. Entry and exit dynamics substantially intensied, the level change
in nancial void grew signicantly, and bank choice markedly declined. Second, all three
changes in branch network dynamics also consistently extended (even with greater intensity)
into the ve-year period after the liberalization peak. Third, the immediate and longer-term
spatial ramications of the nancial sector liberalization were very distinct. All the immediate
changes systematically, di¤erentially impacted the poorer and wealthier neighborhoods. During
the liberalization peak, branches were consistently more likely to exit the poorer neighborhoods
and enter their wealthier counterparts. Also, the level of nancial void spread unevenly, with
poorer neighborhoods experiencing a sudden, signicant increase in bank desert and sharp
decline in bank choice. Interestingly, the spatial patterns of change following the liberalization
peak, which is when banks began to reap the cost and revenue advantages from consolidation,
no longer exhibited this systematic relationship with neighborhood income.
Apart from these substantive results, we also contribute to the methodological literature
on spatial processes. The methodological advances we make yield novel measures of branch
presence, entry, exit and choice, which minimize the discretization that which commonly a¤ects
traditional count measures, and unlike the measures from a pure point pattern approach (e.g.
Marcon and Puech, 2003; Duranton and Overman, 2005), can be reliably linked to discrete
neighbourhoods. And so our measures combine the best of both worlds, if you will.
This paper explores the spatial characteristics of the aggregate branch network and its evo-
lutions, not of the individual branch location decisions that could lead to the patterns observed.
In doing so, we sidestep the methodological challenges involved with the study of interrelated
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discrete decisions like the choice over branch location (Draganska et al., 2008; Seim, 2006). Ef-
fectively, branch location decisions are quite complex and typically involve the consideration of
a number of demand, cost, and competitive (strategic) factors. Theoretical analyses of location
choice frequently yield very di¤erent predictions depending on the assumptions made about
transportation costs, the availability of outside options, the number of competitors, and the
shape of the product space. Furthermore, adding to the complexity but also the fragility - of
these models, location decisions are often also tied with decisions over product characteristics
and price. Our aim therefore is not to lean too heavily on particular predictions, which can
be dependent on modeling specications. We simply seek to motivate the following intuitive
propositions: (i) greater competitive pressures brought about by liberalization reforms can
measurably perturb the spatial dynamics and conguration of branch networks; (ii) in the
event of which aggregate patterns of change are likely to diminish overall bank availability and
choice, and in a rst instance, more severely so in the poorer neighborhoods. More specically,
econometrically speaking, by focusing on aggregate patterns and change, missing information
about the unobserved branch characteristics or the strategic, complex interactions between
rivaling branches within a neighborhood can be treated as classical, zero-mean, measurement
error in the dependent variables, With the aggregate approach, we are also able to more di-
rectly identify the net e¤ects of liberalization reforms on local customers (in terms of branch
availability and choice), which is coherent with the focus of our paper. Again, this implies that
our econometric model can be simply seen as a reduced form specication summing of all
the di¤erent actions individual branches may take (enter, exit, stay, not enter).
To test whether the peak in liberalization reforms and technological change in the late
nineties distinctly a¤ected the spatial dynamics of branch networks, we simply contrast the
characteristics of these dynamics over three ve-year windows before liberalization peaked,
coinciding with the liberalization peak, and after the liberalization peak. We constructed our
own panel dataset about the dynamics of bank branch networks within the metropolitan area
of Antwerp between 1991 and 2006, and matched these data with detailed and remarkably ne-
grained residential data. This has allowed us to shed light on the spatial dynamics of branch
networks in relation to the banksprivate customer base. Interestingly, the great majority of the
empirical literature in Belgium (but not just in Belgium) has been studying bank organization,
lending relationships (including their geographical aspects), and bank competition in relation
to the bankscommercial customer base in particular, small and medium enterprises instead
(Degryse, Laeven and Ongena, 2009; Degryse and Ongena, 2005, 2007). And yet, transactions
with private customers constitute a far from trivial share of overall bank revenues. For example,
of all credits granted by banks in 2006, 37.3 % were granted to private persons, and 33.9 %
to businesses (Febeln, 2006). The economic signicance of the private customer market thus
renders shifting focus, as we do with this paper, to understanding bank behaviours in relation
to the private consumers particularly relevant.
This paper adds new empirical insight to a large literature on spatial competition and
market structure. Dick (2006) nds that the Riegle-Neal branching deregulation in the US
in the 1990s led to increased concentration at the regional level, but left the structure of
metropolitan markets nearly una¤ected. Our focus is on changes within the metropolitan
market of Antwerp, and so compared to Dicks study is at a more disaggregate level. Perhaps
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our work is most closely related to the works by Waldfogel and co-authors (2003, 2006, 2007)
investigating how demographics (in particular consumer preference heterogeneity) impact a
consumer markets structure and geography. They empirically analyze a wide range of markets,
including the market for radio stations, newspapers, television and restaurants. Interestingly,
the banking sector shares an important characteristic with these other markets namely its
lumpiness that is, the high xed cost relative to market size of operating a branch. At the
same time, contrary to those markets, for a bank, not all private customers are equal1 from a
protability perspective or put di¤erently, the marginal expected benet and costs of servicing
a new client strongly covary with the clients income prole. And so, when overall competitive
pressures intensied as they did in the late nineties, aggregate branch recongurations are
expected to likewise covary with income prole of neighborhood markets. And this is precisely
what we nd.
There are several studies that empirically examine the geography of banks (e.g. Morrison
and OBrian, 2001 [New Zealand]; Damar, 2007 [Turkey]; Avery et al., 1999 [US]; Greve, 2000
[Japan]; Leyshon and Thrift, 1996 [UK]), though none with such high statistical precision and
at such disaggregated level.
Our paper also contributes to the vast body of literature on nancial exclusion. Leyshon
and Thrift (1996) argue, drawing on the experiences of the UK, that one of the most pressing
symptoms of growing nancial exclusion is the closure of branches in low-income neighbour-
hoods. Leyshon, French and Signoretta (2008) provide more recent evidence for the UK that
the closure of banks and building society branches can have signicant consequences for cus-
tomers, who may have to incur additional traveling costs to undertake transactions or obtain
face-to-face advice, in addition to engendering a sense of loss and abandonment within local
communities. Chakravarty (2006) argues the importance of physical presence for the quality
of information on which loan decisions are made, provided sta¤ working in the branch have
relevant loan processing, credit analysis and decision-making authority. More generally, hav-
ing little or no access to formal bank services or, relatedly, making little use of such services,
can lower consumer welfare via its negative impacts on consumer spending, saving and more
broadly household nance management (Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shar, 2006; Thaler,
1990, 1999; Lusardi, 2002).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief historical
background and gives an overview of the data. Section III discusses our methodology. Section
IV presents the results, and Section V concludes.
1Consider the low depository and borrowing power of the poor, the fact that the poor are more likely to fall
behind on bills, and thus the more processing costs that poor clients involve for banks, and the fact that the
poor have less money to save. Furthermore, banks derive a signicant portion of their prots from mortgages
and managing investment portfolios, which are both services of little interest to the poor. Collectively, these
observations help explain why banks would disproportionately close down branches in poor neighbourhoods
when pressed to undertake cost-saving measures.
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2 Historical background and Data
In this section we discuss some essential features of retail-banking in Belgium and the data that
we have specially collected to be able to shed new light on how retail bank networks evolved
on the ground over time, in particular during the liberalization peak in the late nineties.
2.1 Retail-banking in Belgium between 1991 and 2006
The restructuring of Belgiums retail-banking has been on-going for many years, spurred on
by a sustained legislative drive at the EU level since the late-1970s. It came to fruition most
markedly so over the past two decades. Regulatory change aimed to make retail-banking leaner
and tterby encouraging competition. To illustrate, measures like the launch of Europes
Financial Services Action Plan2 and the introduction of the Euro, both in 1999, sought to help
remove barriers to the integration of nancial services markets. Even though (intuitively) such
barriers may well be particularly onerous in retail-banking,3 Belgiums retail-banking landscape
did fundamentally transform, particularly since the late nineties. This section contains more
detail on aggregate-level changes in retail-banking in Belgium as a whole, whereas we expose
the reality of those changes within the metropolitan area of Antwerp in the rest of the paper.
We advance three remarkable and, for our purposes, signicant observations. First, the ris-
ing trend in the index price of banking servicesin Belgium, as plotted in Figure 1, experienced
an abrupt break between 1996 and 2001, precisely when liberalization reforms culminated.
This is consistent with the economic logic that the competitive pressures unleashed by reforms
eroded, albeit only temporarily, prot margins in retail-banking. The index value rose again,
and very steeply so, after 2001 that is, after the massive wave of mergers and acquisitions in
Belgiums retail-banking landscape, which plausibly gave way to price increases once again.4
Second, the temporal pattern of Belgiums banking sectors Herndahl Hirschman Index
(HHI) likewise took a sudden turn around 1996 (Figure 2). Between 1996 and 2001, market
concentration as measured by the HHI almost doubled. Belgium evolved from a moderately
concentrated banking market in 1996 (Alegria and Schaeck, 2008) to one of the most con-
centrated in Europe by 2001 (International Monetary Fund, 2006). Since 2001, Belgiums
retail-banking industry has been dominated by a handful of large banks. Overall consumer
choice nearly halved in the wake of Belgiums retail-bank consolidation wave, and overall branch
network likewise starkly diminished.
Third, in the immediate shadows of the massive, physical reconguring of Belgiums retail-
branch networks, availability and usage of online banking surged. Classic banks began to
boost their online portals, cross-selling products via their website in order to reach new clients
and diversify their distribution channels (Arnaboldi and Claeys, 2008), and introduce home-
banking. In addition, new pure internet banks, such as the Rabobank, started to launch their
2The Annex of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) specically on nancial services was
also introduced around this time, in 1997 to be precise.
3Barriers may well be particularly onerous in retail-banking because of e.g. issues of consumer trust and
condence, causing depositors to prefer local or national banks to foreign banks and local banks privileged
access to information about a borrowers creditworthiness, creating a rent that is unavailable to foreign banks.
4Admittedly, these price increases may also have been commensurate to increases in service quality. However,
we have no data to validate this.
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Figure 1: General price index and index price of banking services, Belgium, 1991-2007
Note: The index price of banking services is dened as the costs of a package of nancial services,
which includes a bank card, the administration costs of a bank account, payment transactions, the
Eurocheque-card (later replaced by the Maestro card), and the rental of a safe. The reference year is
2004.
Source: Directorate General of Statistics, Belgium.
Figure 2: Banking sector Herndahl-Hirschman index, Belgium, 1997-2007
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services in Belgium from 2002 onwards. And with the rising demand for direct banking, banks
sought to further curtail branch sta¢ ng (and hence the availability of face-to-face services).
Between 2000 and 2007, employment in the banking sector in Belgium shrunk by 12 percent
(ING, 2006).
Collectively, these observations suggest that the overall reconguring of Belgiums retail
banking landscape induced by the nancial sector liberalization peak spanned two phases.
First, between 1996 and 2001, overall increased competitive pressures, in part due to the re-
moval of entry barriers, obliged banks to compromise on oligopoly rents. Thus, price margins
on fees being (temporarily) pressured, banksbest response was to raise prots by cutting costs,
notably xed costs rst. In a free entry market, with high xed set-up costs relative to market
size, this is precisely what theories predict, both in the Structure-Conduct-Performance and
endogenous xed costs camps (Bain, 1956; Sutton, 1989, 1996).5 And given that feesprots
are marginally decreasing with savings, it became more protable to reallocate and shift to
wealthier customers. Then, from 2001 through 2006, when through consolidating and ratio-
nalizing, banks were able to reinstate renewed market power, the price war subdued and prices
started to mount once again. Simultaneously though, the demand for online-banking services
accelerated, which rationalized a further reduction of branch networks and sta¢ ng. In sum,
these observations substantiate the design of our panel, allowing us to contrast three ve-year
periods: 1991-1996; 1996-2001; 2001-2006. A discriminate analysis of nancial service liber-
alization along temporal and spatial dimensions, to our knowledge, has not been empirically
demonstrated before. This paper is the rst to do so.
It is noteworthy that the structural changes in Belgiums retail-banking were far from
representative of those in the EU as a whole.6 In fact, there has been, perhaps not surprisingly
so, great divergence in experiences across say the EU15 countries (Goddard et al., 2007). But
this does not make the Belgian case less important. In fact, it is precisely the sheer scale
of changes in Belgiums retail banking network that we exploit to show how branch network
dynamics evolved over time and in space. Whereas most studies analyze the pace and extent of
liberalization at the level of a nation state or larger geographical region, we look at these issues
at a more disaggregated level, shifting focus to the very local level, which is arguably most
relevant to the everyday consumer of bank services. In doing so, we are also able to discriminate
the e¤ects of bank liberalization by neighborhood characteristics, and thus shed light on the
extent to which the liberalization peak had di¤erential impacts on di¤erent consumer groups.
2.2 New Data on Antwerps Branch Network by Neighbourhood over Time
In order to analyze how branch network dynamics evolved over time at a suitably local scale, we
constructed a new panel dataset on Antwerps 233 neighbourhoods. The dataset tracks these
neighbourhoods every ve years between 1991 and 2006, a period that neatly encapsulates the
ve-year regime during which deregulation peaked (1996-2001). Table 1 contains descriptive
5For a recent review of the empirical literature on market concentration and consumer welfare, see Van Hoose
(2010).
6For instance, only in the Netherlands and Denmark did the branch network diminish to such great extents.
Market concentration, as measured by the CR5 index, increased in the majority of EU15 countries, but in no
country to such extreme degree as in Belgium.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Active/tot. pop. 0.63 0.61 0.61
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Average income* 25537 24207 23177
(4686) (4569) (4677)
Non Belgian/tot. pop. 0.11 0.12 0.12
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
Old/tot. pop. 0.18 0.19 0.20
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Total population 1995.74 1953.15 19153.86
(1263) (1218) (1167)
Note: standard deviation in parenthesis
*Real euros, reference year 2000.
Variable/year 1991 1996 2001
statistics for the variables that we use in this paper and describe throughout this section.
Appendix A contains more detail on the construction of these variables.
With its nearly half a million inhabitants, Antwerp is Belgiums second largest city (after
Brussels). Three main features of the city make Antwerp a particularly suitable candidate
for our analyses. First, Antwerps neighbourhoods (even when we exclude those in green and
harbor areas) vary substantially in size, population and average income - variation we are
keen to empirically exploit. Second, the city is characterized by a high degree of residential
segregation and large income and ethnic disparities, which are far more distinct than in any
other Flemish city (Kesteloot et al., 2006). Third, there not only exists a strikingly high degree
of residential segregation, but also a strong persistence in income and ethnic disparities over
time. For instance, gure 3 and 4 show the average income per household in the 1994 and 2004
(classied by quintile), and the two maps are almost identical; the Spearmans rank correlation
of the share of non-Belgian inhabitants across neighbourhoods in 1991 and 2004, respectively,
is equal to 0.97; the same index for average income in 1994 (rst available year) and 2004 is
only slightly smaller (0.86).
Neighbourhoods are the smallest spatial units for which statistical data can be obtained
in Belgium.7 We combined neighborhood level data from various sources. We use population
data from the Belgiums Directorate General Statistics. The income data are all o¢ cial tax
data, corrected for purchasing power (by means of the consumer index) and denominated in
Euro. We use GIS to construct geographic measures, like a neighborhoods area or whether it
should be included as part of the citys centre. Finally, we recorded the addresses of all active
banks in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006 using the National Telephone Directory, and converted
7They were created for the Census in 1970, and revised in 1981 and 2001. Originally they corresponded to
areas with uniform social, economic and morphological characteristics. Over time this within-neighbourhood
uniformity somewhat diminished: although the neighbourhood borders were revised in 2001, changes due to
evolutions in social, economic and morphological characteristics remained limited, in order to easy comparison
over time. However, because the neighbourhoods are rather small (average area of 366,388 m2, which - if they
were circular - would correspond to a radius of 341 m) very large within-neighborhood di¤erences are rare.
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those addresses into x-y coordinates with the help of specialized software (CRAB). These data
in turn constitute the raw datafor our own neighbourhood-level measures of bank presence,
exit and entry, and choice. In the next section, we carefully explain these new spatial measures.
3 Methodology and New Measures of Branch Network and
Choice
A major concern with handling "point event" data, like our branch data, is that when mapping
these data onto neighbourhoods, discretization bias slips in. This bias stems from the fact that
distance is reduced to a binary variable (that is, in or out) and that arbitrary boundaries,
here of the citys neighbourhoods, are simply imposed. In this section, we present several
methodological advances, allowing us to generate new measures of bank presence, exit, entry,
and choice, which both minimize this bias and can be readily and reliably linked to individual
neighbourhoods.
3.1 New Spatial Measures of Bank Presence
The presence, exits, and entries of retail bank branches are essentially collections of "point
events" in space, not dened by any meaningful spatial extension. Most of the time, data of
this kind are aggregated into arbitrarily chosen spatial units, often by means of a simple count
or density ratio. The spatial economics literature, however, has recently emphasized the bias
originating from "taking points on a map and allocating them to units in a box", especially
if the "boxes" (i.e., the spatial units) are heterogeneously shaped and sized (Duranton and
Overman, 2005). This bias stems from the fact that distance is reduced to a binary variable,
and arbitrary boundaries, which may not match real discontinuities in the spatial process under
study, are simply imposed. Furthermore, since many banks in our study are located along a
street which lies on the border of two neighbourhoods, allocating all the banks to one or the
other would yield only a rough approximation of bank presence.
Recent contributions by Marcon and Puech (2003) and Duranton and Overman (2005)
have stressed the benets of using a "point pattern analysis" approach instead. Following
the seminal contribution by Ripley (1976), various statistics based on a continuous denition
of space have been proposed, and applied to the study of location decisions of manufacturing
plants and patterns of industrial agglomeration. The approach has been shown to provide more
precise evidence on the phenomena investigated, signicantly improving comparable statistics
based on discrete spatial units.8
However, in our context a purepoint pattern analysis approach is limiting, as its metric is
di¢ cult to interact with socio-economic variables measured at the level of discrete spatial units
(here, neighbourhoods). Therefore, we advance a new approach, which combines the strengths
of both Point Pattern approach and the traditional count measures, yielding measures of
branch presence and network dynamics, which are more precise than a simple neighborhood
8See for instance the comparison of the Duranton and Overman (2005) metric with the Ellison and Glaeser
index.
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Figure 3: Average income, Antwerp, 1994
9
Figure 4: Average income, Antwerp, 2004
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count of bank events and still neighborhood-specic, and consequently easy to relate to other
neighborhood-specic variables.
We constructed these measures as follows. We rst classied all branches in our longitudinal
database on banks in the metropolitan area of Antwerps retail-banking between 1991 and 2006
as entering, exiting or continuing for each of the three ve-year periods. We thereby applied
simple and intuitive decision rules. For instance, if a bank was present in a certain year, but
had disappeared ve years later, we considered this bank as exiting; in cases where a bank
was not present in a certain year, but appeared ve years later, we considered this bank as
entering within this 5 years period; nally, a bank which was present in both years was dened
as "continuing" over that time interval. In addition, we also undertook several corrections to
avoid that our measures overestimate entry and exit. Firstly, if a bank branch moved within
a distance of 100 meters, then we considered this branch to be continuing.9 We counted 132
such instances. Secondly, if a bank disappeared for a ve-year interval, only to reappear in
the subsequent period, we coded these banks as continuing, and so assumed that this was due
to an inaccuracy in the archives. There were 8 such cases. Note that if the intermittence of
a bank lasted for more than one period, no correction was carried out, and an exit and entry
were recorded consecutively. Thirdly, as our second period coincided with a massive wave of
mergers and acquisitions, we also coded branches as continuing whenever they only changed
bank group but not location.
Next, we calculated a density function around each point event, which generated a highest
value at the location of the event and reaches zero at a distance of 600 meters. We chose
600 meters because this roughly corresponded to the hypothetical diameter of the average
neighborhood, as well as maps into the plausible maximum sphere of bank inuence. Other
distances only slightly a¤ected the value of our measures.10 Then, we imposed a grid of squares
of 65 meters width onto our map. For each cell, we calculated the kernel smoothed sum of the
values for our "point events", applying the quadratic kernel function described in Silverman
(1986). This allowed us to come up with a continuous surface of branch intensity, exit and
entry, covering the whole area under scrutiny. Our approach thus eliminates the "discretization
bias", since the zonal statistic of a spatial unit now also depends on the presence of banks in
the contiguous neighbourhoods, and generally increases the level of spatial precision.
Finally, to come up with a neighborhood-specic statistic of a "branch event" (entry, exit,
net bank ow), we simply summed up its value over all cells that lay inside the neighborhoods
border. Figure 5 graphically illustrates the result for our measure of bank presence, which we
henceforth refer to as the zonal statistic. We demonstrate the higher precision of our zonal
statistic compared to a simple bank count by neighborhood in the appendix, where we re-
estimate all econometric models substituting the zonal statistic metric with the bank counts
9We thus assume that these moves were driven by forces other than the ones that we study. For instance, a
branch may decide to relocate to a more suitable building nearby. These apparent moves may also have been the
result of changes or consistencies in the addresses. We found 132 instances where the branch changed address
but stayed within a distance of 100 meters. For those cases, we kept the original spatial coordinates throughout.
10When we recalculated our results with a distance of 300 meters, we obtained values for both level and ow
statistics that were highly correlated with the results obtained with a distance of 600 m (correlation coe¢ cient of
0.95 and 0.93 respectively). We also repeated all subsequent analyses (in next section) with these other values,
and all results held true.
11
per neighborhood. The methodology has been easy to apply using GIS software.11
3.2 New Spatial Measures of Bank Void and Bank Choice
To complement the set of spatial statistics dened so far, we also developed original measures
of branch mix and branch accessibility.
The measure of branch accessibility aims to capture the degree to which a given neigh-
borhood experiences a nancial void (or nancial desert). The measure essentially quanties
the average area of the map that needs to be covered for any given neighbourhood in order to
meet a rst bank. More intuitively, it reects how far one should walk to nd the nearest bank
branch, starting from a random point in the neighbourhood. We constructed the measure in
four, simple steps. First, we created a regular grid of points at a distance of 100 meters apart,
covering the whole area under analysis. Next, we drew progressively larger circles around each
point until a rst bank was reached. Third, we calculated the number of grid points that lay
within the minimal circle necessary to comprise at least one bank. Intuitively, the higher this
number is, the greater the extent of nancial or branch abandonment at that point. Finally,
we computed the average value of these numbers across all points which laid within any given
neighbourhood, giving rise to a neighbourhood-specic statistic. This constituted our nal
measure. Figure 6 provides a graphic illustration of the methodology.
Though related to computations of average shortest distance to an event (here, the rst
bank) used elsewhere, our newly developed measure realizes several improvements. First, we
are able to use a quadratic function of the distance to the rst bank, rather than a linear one,
and thus allow for quadratic transportation costs. Second, by aggregating the number of grid
points within the circle, rather than simply relying on the circles area, we are able to better
control for edge e¤ects, i.e., for the fact that neighbourhoods close to the border of the map
need a relatively bigger distance (circle radius) to nd a given number of banks within a given
distance than do central neighbourhoods (given that the point grid covers only the area of the
map, the number of points approximate the number of potential locations of banks).12
Our measure of branch mix or variety aims to quantify the degree of bank diversity, or choice
available to customers in a given neighbourhood. Arguably the most immediate procedure to
obtain such measure would be to compute a standard diversity index, like the Herndahl index,
at the neighbourhood level. However, such an index would still be prone to the discretization
bias we highlighted before; furthermore, the neighbourhoodssize, position, or the characteris-
tics of other contiguous neighbourhoods would not be taken into account. Hence, we developed
a new index which overcomes those shortcomings.
Our measure of branch mix is conceptually simple and similar to the one we adopted for
the "bank desert". We used the same grid of points 100 meters apart, and drew progressively
larger circles around each point until branches belonging to (at least) three di¤erent bank
groups were met. The rest of the calculation was the same as the one used for the measure of
bank desert: we calculated the total number of points of the grid that lay within the largest
circle and then calculated the average for each neighbourhood. Again, the statistic is easy
11More precisely, we used two tools available in ESRI ArcInfo: the kernel smoothing tool, and the zonal
statistic.
12Marcon and Puech (2003) report a detailed discussion of edge e¤ects in point pattern analysis.
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Figure 5: The zonal statistic
Note: the gure reports the city of Antwerp under analysis, in year 2001. The small triangles represent
banks, the polygons are neighbourhoods, and the dark surface is the zonal statistic.
Source: Authorselaboration.
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Figure 6: Measure of bank choice
Note: the gure reports the city of Antwerp under analysis, in year 2001. The small triangles represent
banks, the polygons are neighbourhoods, the points the grid; the circles correspond to the area to be
covered to reach the rst bank.
Source: Authorselaboration.
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to interpret: a bigger average circle corresponds to a longer hypothetical multi-directional
walk from a point of the grid to enjoy a satisfactory di¤erentiation of the supply of retail
banking services. The correlation with the Herndahl index calculated at neighbourhood level
is signicant but small (the Pearsons linear correlation is equal to 0.2, and the Spearmans
rank correlation to 0.17), suggesting that our measure is indeed capturing di¤erent information
as opposed to more traditional competition measures.
It is worth noticing that both our measures are neighbourhood-specic, but at the same
time they depend non-parametrically on the spatial structure of the data, as is the case with
the measures of bank entries and exits. They are easily comparable across spatial units and
time periods. Technically, the measures have been calculated with a simple function in Matlab
developed by one of the authors (available upon request).
In table 2, we report the summary statistics of our measures of branch presence, network,
and choice. The table shows that over the 1991-2006 period, the average level of bank presence
in Antwerp shrunk by over the 25%, while the average distance to the rst bank increased by
35%, and the distance to meet three di¤erent bank groups increased by 41%.
Table 2: Measure of bank presence and choice
Zonal statistic (level) 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.32
(0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.31)
Entry 0.08 0.10 0.08
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11)
Exit 0.10 0.12 0.15
(0.10) (0.14) (0.15)
Dist. to 1st bank 49.90 54.32 55.73 67.52
(71.18) (73.2) (74.1) (92.5)
Dist. to 3 diff. groups 87.06 93.05 94.13 122.97
(101.9) (107.0) (101.3) (133.9)
Note: standard deviation in parenthesis
2006Variable/year 1991 1996 2001
4 Empirics
In the next sections we present the empirical results on bank presence dynamics (4.1) and
measures of bank void and choice (4.2) over time, and their relationship to neighborhood
characteristics. Apart from the results, we also present spatial diagnostics and some robustness
tests.
4.1 Retail-Branch Dynamics and Neighborhood Characteristics
We explore the characteristics of aggregate retail-branch patterns over time and in relation to
the geography of the everyday consumer. In particular, we analyze the extent to which the
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liberalization peak a¤ected these patterns. To this end, we estimate and contrast a series of
regressions of the following form:
4yst;t+5 =
X
t
tX
s
t +
X
t
tWX
s
t +  t + 
s + st + "s;t (1)
where 4yst;t+5 is the change in the zonal statistic of the outcome of interest (the latter
being either bank entry, bank exit or net bank presence as a combination of both entries and
exits) over each ve-year period, starting at year t, in neighbourhood s, Xst is a vector of
neighbourhood-specic characteristics at time t, WX is a vector of those same characteristics
but now spatially lagged,13  is a xed e¤ect for each of the nine districts in the city of Antwerp,
 is a time xed e¤ect, and " is a neighbourhood-time specic error term.14 The coe¢ cients
of interest are elements of both  and , which we allow to change over time.
To minimize simultaneity bias, we always regress the aggregate change in retail-branching
over a ve-year time span onto neighborhood characteristics at the beginning of that period.
In addition, because of the high degree of residential segregation in Antwerp and its persistent
neighbourhood income disparities, concerns with reverse causality (a change in branch presence
leading to a change in neighbourhood income) are unlikely to a¤ect our conclusions. Hence-
forth, to ease our exposition, we will refer to the periods 1991-1996, 1996-2001 and 2001-2006,
as respectively periods one, two and three.
4.1.1 Results
Table 3 presents results of estimating equation 1 using OLS for all 233 neighbourhoods of
Antwerps metropolitan area, with a limited selection of control variables namely, neighbor-
hood average income, log of neighborhood population, and a time period xed e¤ect. Overall,
the evidence in Table 2 suggests signicantly di¤erent dynamics in branching between our three
time periods. We nd that only in period 2, neighborhood income signicantly and strongly
predicted both net branch entry and net branch exit (and by extension net change). The
magnitudes of these e¤ects are remarkably high. To illustrate, one percentage point reduction
in the average neighborhood income corresponds to more than one standard deviation increase
in exit of bank branches. The e¤ect of neighborhood income on the zonal statistic of net pres-
ence appears to extend to the subsequent ve-year block, 2001-2006, though this relationship
weakens (becomes only half as large) and underlying patterns of entry and exit dynamics are
clearly distinct from those in period two.
In Table 4 we estimate equation 1 again, this time with additional control variables. In
Table 5, we add these additional control variables as well as the spatially lagged versions of these
13We constructed the spatially lagged variables as follows. First, we created an inverse distance matrix
including all the neighbourhoods within 2 km from the neighbourhood under consideration (distance is calculated
at the centroid of the neighbourhood). We then created the lagged variables by pre-multiplying the matrix of
explanatory variables by the row-standardized inverse distance matrix. The spatially lagged version of a variable
is thus equal to the average of the values of this variable in the neighboring neighbourhoods, weighted by distance.
In the tables, we indicate the spatially lagged variables with a Win front of the variable name.
14Since we are especially interested in assessing how the ows of bank presence relate to the stocks of the
explanatory variables in di¤erent time periods, we do not include neighbourhood xed e¤ects as these would
absorb most of the e¤ect of the regressors, which generally show little variability across time.
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Table 3: Regressions of zonal statistic, ows
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES  zonal statistic Entries Exits
Average income 1991 0.0284 0.103** 0.0750*
(0.0395) (0.0481) (0.0387)
Average income 1996 0.152*** 0.0662* -0.0859**
(0.0363) (0.0393) (0.0387)
Average income 2001 0.0716** 0.0546 -0.0168
(0.0345) (0.0414) (0.0466)
Tot. pop. (log) -0.0133*** 0.0296*** 0.0429***
(0.00459) (0.00663) (0.00746)
dummy rst period -0.0866 -0.711** -0.626***
(0.225) (0.274) (0.223)
dummy second period -0.760*** -0.483** 0.279
(0.206) (0.226) (0.228)
dummy third period -0.356* -0.430* -0.0760
(0.194) (0.234) (0.263)
Observations 699 699 699
R2 0.167 0.400 0.513
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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control variables. In particular, as additional control variables, we include several measures
of consumer types to assess the extent to which di¤erent customer proles motivated spatial
dynamics of branch network. The centre dummy is meant to allow for di¤erences in branching
dynamics between neighbourhoods situated in the city centre (within the Ringway surrounding
the centre of Antwerp), and those outside this area. We also include the natural log of the level
value of the relevant zonal statistic in order to control for the pre-existing location of banks and
for existing competition, and thus as a proxy for unobserved neighbourhood characteristics,
which may a¤ect the desirability from a banks standpoint to locate a branch there. The
time-district xed e¤ects included are meant to control for idiosyncratic shocks at the city and
district levels, as well as unobserved factors such as the number of local businesses,15 and road
and public transport networks.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that the inclusion of more control variables a¤ects the
magnitude and signicance of our income coe¢ cients, but leaves unchanged the main conclu-
sions on branch network dynamics and their relation to neighbourhood income. Furthermore,
the nding that spatially lagged income in 1996 also signicantly correlates with branch net-
work changes reinforces our main nding so far: that is, both net entry and net exit of bank
branching (and not only the net e¤ect on bank presence) over period 2 bore systematic re-
lationships with initial neighbourhood wealth in ways that not only disadvantaged the poor
(with banks exiting from poor neighborhoods) but also distinctly advantaged their wealthier
counterparts (with banks entering wealthier neighborhoods).
We nd a systematic, positive relationship between the net ow of banks and the proportion
of elderly living in the neighborhood both in periods 1 and 3, though we suspect for di¤erent
reasons. The positive relationship in period 1, we conjecture, may have been driven by bank
groups need to expand their customer base (see also positive coe¢ cient on share of non-Belgian
population in 1991), whereas in period 3, this e¤ect may have been more of a consequence of
the onset of new technologies (notably home-banking), which the elderly use far less.
4.1.2 Spatial Diagnostics
Spatial dependency is generally detected through evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the
residuals, which may be due to three categories of spatial e¤ects. First is the correlation
between the spatially lagged regressors and the dependent variable (i.e., WX a¤ects Y). For
instance, banks may be entering a neighbourhood because contiguous neighbourhoods are
becoming richer (and are obtaining more banks as well). In our empirical specication, we
fully account for this e¤ect by including the set of spatially lagged variables.
The second problem may be due to unobserved similarity in contiguous observations arising
from factors which may or may not be correlated with the included regressors. In the former
case, there is an omitted variable bias; whereas in the latter case, only the precision of the
estimates is a¤ected. To illustrate, banks might be entering a specic area because of a newly
built road. Since we do not have data on roads, this is an unobservable factor to us, which
may or may not a¤ect the socio-economic characteristics of a neighbourhood. We partially
15 Ideally it would be better to control directly for the di¤usion of retail businesses by neighbourhoods, as
they are likely to a¤ect branch location. Unfortunately, such detailed data are not available.
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Table 4: Regressions of zonal statistic, ows, further controls
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES  zonal statistic Entry Exits
Average income 1991 0.0968* 0.161** 0.0644**
(0.0552) (0.0659) (0.0315)
Average income 1996 0.284*** 0.174*** -0.110***
(0.0526) (0.0429) (0.0329)
Average income 2001 0.0814 0.0931* 0.0119
(0.0598) (0.0516) (0.0378)
Zonal statistic -0.115*** 0.196*** 0.311***
(0.0157) (0.0143) (0.0123)
Active/tot pop. 1991 0.152 0.330*** 0.176
(0.153) (0.110) (0.112)
Active/tot pop. 1996 -0.511** -0.184 0.328***
(0.202) (0.160) (0.119)
Active/tot pop. 2001 0.198 0.136 -0.0617
(0.144) (0.108) (0.0931)
Tot. pop. (log) 0.00307 -0.00308 -0.00616*
(0.00417) (0.00426) (0.00328)
Non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 0.254*** 0.159* -0.0945
(0.0895) (0.0886) (0.0634)
Non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 0.162 0.130 -0.0322
(0.110) (0.0905) (0.0706)
Non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 0.0258 0.0609 0.0345
(0.117) (0.0922) (0.0844)
Elderly/tot pop. 1991 0.411*** 0.352*** -0.0609
(0.136) (0.113) (0.0947)
Elderly/tot pop. 1996 0.000818 0.156 0.155
(0.162) (0.162) (0.110)
Elderly/tot pop. 2001 0.287** 0.173* -0.114
(0.122) (0.0899) (0.0826)
Centre dummy -0.00320 0.0154 0.0186**
(0.0148) (0.0157) (0.00837)
Time f.e. YES YES YES
District. f.e. YES YES YES
Time-district f.e. YES YES YES
Observations 699 699 699
R2 0.342 0.685 0.849
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 19
Table 5: Regressions of zonal statistic, ows, further controls and spatial lags
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES  zonal statistic Entries Exits
Average income 1991 0.0551 0.106* 0.0513
Average income 1996 0.229*** 0.167*** -0.0629*
Average income 2001 0.0479 0.0763 0.0286
zonal statistic -0.115*** 0.197*** 0.311***
Active/tot pop. 1991 0.227 0.492*** 0.263**
Active/tot pop. 1996 -0.421* -0.150 0.273*
Active/tot pop. 2001 0.291* 0.0994 -0.192*
Tot. pop. (log) 0.00151 -0.00438 -0.00590*
non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 0.228** 0.274*** 0.0458
non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 -0.0127 -0.0112 0.00247
non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 0.148 0.0938 -0.0554
elderly/tot pop. 1991 0.397** 0.438*** 0.0396
elderly/tot pop. 1996 -0.0495 0.128 0.179
elderly/tot pop. 2001 0.312** 0.137 -0.175*
W average income 1991 -0.0205 0.123 0.144
W average income 1996 0.587*** 0.0968 -0.491***
W average income 2001 0.0685 -0.0313 -0.0999
W zonal statistic 0.0655 0.0850 0.0195
W active/tot pop. 1991 -0.369 -0.707* -0.336
W active/tot pop. 1996 -0.569 -0.865** -0.299
W active/tot pop. 2001 0.0305 0.208 0.179
W tot. pop. (log) 0.0392 -0.0136 -0.0526**
W elderly/tot pop. 1991 0.585 0.117 -0.468
W elderly/tot pop. 1996 -0.218 -0.329 -0.114
W elderly/tot pop. 2001 0.0365 0.0664 0.0327
W non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 -0.217 -0.541* -0.324
W non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 0.938*** 0.420 -0.520**
W non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 -0.385 -0.280 0.107
Centre dummy -0.00805 0.0160 0.0241
Time f.e. YES YES YES
District. f.e. YES YES YES
Time-district f.e. YES YES YES
Observations 699 699 699
R2 0.374 0.700 0.858
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time, district, and time-district dummies included in all the specications
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deal with this problem by including the district dummies.
The third spatial e¤ect concerns the causal e¤ect of the contiguous dependent variable on
the dependent variable (WY a¤ects Y). To illustrate, banks might be exiting a neighbourhood
because a lot of banks are entering the contiguous neighbourhoods, thus raising competition
pressures. We do not control for this type of spatial e¤ect. To the extent that this e¤ect is at
play, it may be introducing a bias in our estimates. Indeed, from a theoretical ground, it is
plausible that the net change in branch presence in one neighbourhood has true causal e¤ects
on changes in contiguous neighbourhoods. Models tted to cope with this, called "spatial lag
models", cannot be estimated using OLS because the spatially lagged dependent variable would
then be endogenous by construction (this is also known as "you are your neighbours neighbour"
problem), and are thus generally estimated by maximum likelihood (Anselin, 1988). However,
in a longitudinal setting, further complications arise and frontier econometric techniques need
to be applied (for a survey of available methods see Elhorst, 2009). Avoiding these models,
whenever they are not strictly necessary, is rewarding in terms of both e¢ ciency and simplicity
of estimates.
Table 6: Spatial diagnostics, p-values
Period Dep. var. LM error LM error robust LM sp. lag LM sp. lag robust
net ow 0.50 0.28 0.27 0.16
1991-1996 entry 0.31 0.12 0.07 0.03
exit 0.18 0.73 0.19 0.93
net ow 0.76 0.66 0.66 0.58
1996-2001 entry 0.79 0.63 0.69 0.57
exit 0.87 0.07 0.68 0.07
net ow 0.54 0.97 0.51 0.80
2001-2006 entry 0.55 0.07 0.94 0.09
exit 0.54 0.06 0.84 0.08
Appropriate statistical tests show that more complex models are indeed unnecessary in our
context. More precisely, we estimate model 1 again, this time in a cross-section setting (thus
allowing all the coe¢ cients to vary over time) and including a spatial autoregressive parameter
in the error term. The error term then has the following structure:
i = Wi + ui (2)
where  is the spatial autoregressive parameter, W is a spatial contiguity matrix, and u
is a vector of homoskedastic and uncorrelated errors. We then run a Lagrange Multiplier
test on the signicance of the  coe¢ cient, in both the standard and robust version (Anselin
and Hudak, 1992). Subsequently, we estimate a spatial lag version of our model by adding a
spatially lagged dependent variable on the RHS of the equation (WY ). Again, we then run
a Lagrange Multiplier test (and its robust counterpart) of signicance of the autoregressive
parameter . The results of the test are reported in Table 6: none of the non-robust versions
of the tests are signicant at 5% level, and only one statistic is signicant at 10% (LM spatial
lag for entry in 1991-96). Considering that the robust tests should not be considered when the
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non robust versions are not signicant (Anselin et al., 1996; Anselin and Florax, 1995), we can
therefore conclude that, overall, the model reported in equation 1 does not omit signicant
spatial e¤ects.
4.1.3 Robustness Checks
A massive wave of mergers and acquisitions (henceforth, M&As) swept through the Belgian
banking sector during the period of analysis, and especially from the late 90s onwards. This
might have a¤ected branch closures in periods 2 and 3 in two ways. First, M&As are often
followed by a general rationalization of the existing branch network; second, we may observe a
number of closures of branches due to the fact that two contiguous banks belonging to di¤erent
groups before the M&A became part of the same group after the M&A; as a consequence, one
of the two closed. While the rst factor is di¢ cult to identify in the data (we do not know
how many branches of the same groups would have closed in absence of the M&A), we can
instead detect fairly precisely all the branches which closed for the second reason. We therefore
decided to identify them, and to estimate the same OLS regressions reported in Tables 3-5,
but now excluding the exits due to M&As.
Specically, for every branch exiting in a given period, we checked whether this branch had
become part of the same bank group as the one of another bank located within the range of
300 meters following an M&A, or whether there was another bank within the range 300 meters
that had become part of the same group. If one of these two conditions was fullled, then we
identied this exit as an exit due to M&As. It turns out that these M&A-exits account for
about one third of all exits in the second and third period (we do not observe any M&A in the
rst period).
Subsequently, we re-estimated equation 1, this time without the exits due to M&As. Re-
sults, reported in Table 7 and 8 , reveal that, overall, excluding M&A-induced exits does not
contradict our main results.16 The estimated coe¢ cients are less precise and smaller in mag-
nitude, which suggests that the net M&A-related exits were correlated with the general trend
of exits and that they were not randomly located in space.
A second concern for the robustness of our results relates to small bank-groups. Those
may introduce noise into our measure of branch presence, as they may target specic customer
groups and show peculiar location strategies. We therefore run the same regressions considering
only banks belonging to the major ve groups in Belgium: AXA, DEXIA, FORTIS, ING and
KBC. The big veaccount for around two thirds of all branches in Antwerp. As compared
to results from the whole sample, now in the regression of entries (column 2 of table 9) the
coe¢ cient on income for the second period is reduced, although still signicant; and this
obviously a¤ects also the same coe¢ cient in the regression of net ows (column 1 of 9). This
implies that, in the immediate aftermath of liberalization, bigger bank groups were somewhat
less reluctant to open branches in poor neighbourhoods. Apart from this, overall the results
look extremely similar to the ones we presented previously.
16We omitted standard errors from Table 8 to ease readability; the full table is available from the authors
upon request
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Table 7: Regressions excluding exits due to mergers
(1) (2)
VARIABLES  zonal statistic Exits
Average income 1991 0.0324 0.0710*
(0.0395) (0.0384)
Average income 1996 0.0893** -0.0232
(0.0362) (0.0233)
Average income 2001 0.0404 0.0144
(0.0284) (0.0365)
Tot. pop. (log) -0.00412 0.0337***
(0.00451) (0.00616)
dummy rst period -0.176 -0.536**
(0.226) (0.218)
dummy second period -0.439** -0.0431
(0.201) (0.143)
dummy third period -0.210 -0.221
(0.163) (0.209)
Observations 699 699
R2 0.064 0.498
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Regressions excluding exits due to mergers, further controls
(1) (3) (2) (4)
VARIABLES  zonal statistic Exits  zonal statistic Exits
Average income 1991 0.0772 0.0840*** 0.0300 0.0764**
Average income 1996 0.236*** -0.0617** 0.200*** -0.0338
Average income 2001 0.0466 0.0467 0.0237 0.0528*
zonal statistic -0.0281* 0.225*** -0.0320* 0.229***
Active/tot pop. 1991 0.0273 0.301*** 0.145 0.345***
Active/tot pop. 1996 -0.328 0.145 -0.389 0.241*
Active/tot pop. 2001 0.122 0.0145 0.111 -0.0124
Tot. pop. (log) -0.00178 -0.00131 -0.00392 -0.000470
non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 0.115 0.0438 0.181* 0.0928
non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 0.169* -0.0392 -0.0236 0.0134
non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 -0.0142 0.0744 0.0247 0.0681
elderly/tot pop. 1991 0.206 0.144* 0.240 0.196**
elderly/tot pop. 1996 0.142 0.0141 0.00344 0.126
elderly/tot pop. 2001 0.241** -0.0683 0.206 -0.0695
W average income 1991 -0.0207 0.144
W average income 1996 0.387** -0.291**
W average income 2001 -0.126 0.0951
W zonal statistic 0.163** -0.0784*
W active/tot pop. 1991 -0.835 0.129
W active/tot pop. 1996 -0.352 -0.516
W active/tot pop. 2001 0.0386 0.171
W tot. pop. (log) -0.0108 -0.00265
W elderly/tot pop. 1991 0.242 -0.125
W elderly/tot pop. 1996 0.0626 -0.394
W elderly/tot pop. 2001 0.151 -0.0820
W non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 -0.535* -0.00554
W non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 0.832*** -0.414**
W non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 -0.361 0.0824
centre 0.0145 0.000901 0.00142 0.0146
Time f.e. YES YES YES YES
District. f.e. YES YES YES YES
Time-district f.e. YES YES YES YES
Observations 699 699 699 699
R2 0.171 0.797 0.211 0.804
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Regressions of zonal statistic, ows, 5 biggest bank groups only
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES  zonal statistic Entry Exits
Average income 1991 -0.0131 0.0698** 0.0828**
(0.0381) (0.0346) (0.0326)
Average income 1996 0.185** 0.0720** -0.113***
(0.0416) (0.0324) (0.0329)
Average income 2001 0.0497 0.0321 -0.0175
(0.0341) (0.0236) (0.0331)
Zonal statistic -0.0935*** 0.0980*** 0.192***
(0.0141) (0.00888) (0.0101)
Active/tot pop. 1991 -0.0438 0.284*** 0.327***
(0.165) (0.0843) (0.122)
Active/tot pop. 1996 -0.300** -0.139 0.161
(0.132) (0.0911) (0.0940)
Active/tot pop. 2001 0.127 0.0670 -0.0597
(0.139) (0.102) (0.0804)
Tot. pop. (log) 0.000102 0.00453 0.00442
(0.00334) (0.00238) (0.00292)
Non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 0.159** 0.151*** -0.00798
(0.0766) (0.0507) (0.0622)
Non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 0.0711 0.0419 -0.0292
(0.0907) (0.0596) (0.0729)
Non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 -0.00784 0.0391 0.0469
(0.0892) (0.0532) (0.0774)
Elderly/tot pop. 1991 0.178 0.314*** 0.136
(0.122) (0.0758) (0.0912)
Elderly/tot pop. 1996 0.0865 0.0454 -0.0411
(0.114) (0.0816) (0.0838)
Elderly/tot pop. 2001 0.0942 0.0606 -0.0336
(0.125) (0.0848) (0.0765)
Centre dummy -0.00413 0.00186 0.00599
(0.0101) (0.00770) (0.00830)
Time f.e. YES YES YES
District. f.e. YES YES YES
Time-district f.e. YES YES YES
Observations 699 699 699
R2 0.361 0.601 0.751
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 25
4.2 Bank Void, Bank Choice and Neighborhood characteristics
We analyze spatial patterns of bank void and bank choice using a very similar approach to
the one advanced in the previous subsection. Technically, we estimate the same empirical
specication as in equation 1. However, our measures of bank void and bank choice have
di¤erent spatial properties than the zonal statistics, as they are (by construction) much more
dependent on the value of the same variable in contiguous neighbourhoods - which, in passing,
was exactly one of the aims of the statistic. The econometric consequence of this is that
now the null hypothesis that a spatial autoregressive component for the dependent variable
is insignicant cannot be rejected. Adding spatially lagged control variables to our model, as
we did for the analysis of branch dynamics, would not solve the problem. The parameters of
these spatially lagged controls would only reect the nuisance in the data, instead of reecting
a causal e¤ect of the controls on the dependent variable. Hence, a spatial lag model is likely
to absorb mainly this component, rather than a true causal e¤ect on the dependent variable
originating from its spatial lags. We, therefore, prefer to estimate equation 1 using OLS, also
considering that alternative estimations - reported in Appendix B - based on spatial lag and
spatial error models, gave very similar results.
Just like the zonal statistics in the previous subsection, our measure of bank void is a
measure of bank location. Therefore, subsequent analyses with bank void as the dependent
variable also serve as a robustness check of the previous results. Interestingly, the correlation
between the change in bank void and change in zonal statistic at the neighbourhood level is
about 0.2, which suggests that the two measures do capture distinct, albeit related constructs.
4.2.1 Results
Results in column 1 of Table 10 show that only in period 2 the net change in bank void was very
strongly negatively correlated with average income. This nding is robust across the di¤erent
specications.
Column 2 of Table 10 provides evidence that only in period 2 the distance to at least
three distinct banks increased signicantly in people living in poorer neighbourhoods. Table
11 conrms that our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables.
Finally, the nding that in period three the proportion of elderly citizens (holding every-
thing else constant) negatively predicts the net change in bank desert and choice is again
consistent with our earlier nding that this also positively predicted net ow of bank. It also
lends support to our earlier conjecture that the dynamics in period three were plausibly more
strongly driven by technological innovations. The overall restructuring of bank networks (in
period three) thus appears to show special concern for the elderly, who tend to lag behind in
the adoption of home banking, and (no less) importantly constitute capturedclients of banks
(DellAriccia and Marquez, 2000).
4.3 Discussion
We analyzed ve distinct measures of change, capturing the branch network dynamics, branch
availability and bank choice, and they all support our main insights. The nancial liberaliza-
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Table 10: regression of bank "desert" and bank choice
(1) (2)
VARIABLES  dist 1st bank  dist 3 groups
Average income 1991 1.966 22.53
(11.24) (16.62)
Average income 1996 -15.26*** -37.69***
(4.802) (13.90)
Average income 2001 24.08 41.54*
(15.87) (23.51)
Tot. pop. (log) -4.240* -5.725**
(2.491) (2.761)
dummy rst period 24.55 -76.71
(67.84) (88.93)
dummy second period 115.8*** 249.1***
(35.92) (80.45)
dummy third period -87.99 -154.8
(81.58) (126.8)
Observations 699 699
R2 0.070 0.133
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: regression of bank "desert" and bank choice, further controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES  dist 1st bank  dist 1st bank  dist 3 groups  dist 3 groups
Average income 1991 -5.476 4.463 14.99 35.41**
Average income 1996 -20.21*** -11.88** -39.60*** -29.83**
Average income 2001 1.919 18.83 13.51 2.068
Zonal statistic 1.311 2.943 0.593 -0.611
Active/tot pop. 1991 2.605 0.948 7.319 -88.51**
Active/tot pop. 1996 -36.58 -31.09 68.03 90.10
Active/tot pop. 2001 -108.0* -129.5* -71.30* -184.9**
Tot. pop. (log) -4.523* -3.544 -5.020* -5.235*
non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 -22.08 0.855 -15.97 -5.167
non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 -26.86 -9.862 14.93 29.08
non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 -92.48 -23.07 85.76 2.853
Elderly/tot pop. 1991 -31.73 -19.07 -55.63 -102.1**
Elderly/tot pop. 1996 -44.63* -34.87** 37.45 45.51
Elderly/tot pop. 2001 -197.4*** -183.6*** -65.48 -181.2**
W average income 1991 -12.06 9.497
W average income 1996 -71.36** -27.25
W average income 2001 -140.6* 251.2**
W zonal statistic -70.87*** -37.11
W active/tot pop. 1991 -75.63 374.7**
W active/tot pop. 1996 -109.2** -301.6*
W active/tot pop. 2001 292.5* 229.4
W tot. pop. (log) -20.28* -33.67
W elderly/tot pop. 1991 -241.0* -185.8
W elderly/tot pop. 1996 -73.54 -277.6*
W elderly/tot pop. 2001 -330.2* 130.2
W non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 -11.48 199.6**
W non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 -75.50 69.73
W non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 -463.6** 617.0***
centre -0.768 -3.031 6.496 -12.33
Observations 699 699 699 699
R2 0.201 0.265 0.394 0.430
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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tion peak in the late nineties e¤ectively accelerated and altered the spatial dynamics of bank
branch networks. Its immediate e¤ects directly and systematically disenfranchised the poor.
Intensied branch dynamics persisted well beyond the liberalization peak, though then indis-
criminately, showing no systematic relationship with neighborhood income. Indirectly though,
since banks not only further rationed their branches but also hastened to curtail available
face-to-face services, the branch network dynamics between 2001 and 2006 arguably also hurt
the poor disproportionately more.
The nding that liberalization, in rst instance, led to a greater reduction in proximity to,
and choice over, banks in the poorest neighbourhoods brings some important policy implica-
tions. Admittedly, physical proximity is not the only dimension of bank quality that matters
to consumers. For instance, people also care about the price and quality of bank service. In
fact, with the overall growing use of internet services, one might expect physical distance to
a bank branch and its rival to loose importance. Though important, these considerations do
not undermine the signicance of our results, not least because proximity is arguably still
particularly important for the poor. First, the poor are much less likely to own a car. As a
consequence, Dieleman, Dijiest and Burghouwt (2002) show that the poor in the Netherlands
are relatively more likely to shop locally than the wealthy. Talukdar (2008) likewise nds sim-
ilar di¤erential price search patterns by poverty level and whether the household has access to
a car. Second, internet penetration and usage is still far smaller amongst the poor, suggesting
that the poor will continue to be more heavily dependent on face-to-face bank services than on
internet services in the foreseeable future. But also, given that they also tend to perform worse
on nancial literacy tests, the poor are arguably also in greater need of additional, face-to-face
support. Finally, Degryse and Ongena (2007) provide evidence that even small and medium
enterprises in Belgium tend to consume bank services locally.
Consequences of having fewer banks to choose from or having to travel longer distances to
reach a bank, as demonstrated elsewhere, can be wide-ranging. It may lead people to make
less use of bank services, or even avoid banks altogether. Also, as Degryse and Ongena (2005)
show for small and medium enterprises in Belgium, that physical distance between a private
borrower and a bank and its rivals a¤ects the loan conditions.
Our ndings suggest a role for government to help bu¤er the revealed immediate, adverse
implications of liberalization reforms for lower-income households. Possible, relevant interven-
tions are wide-ranging: they could be as simple as lowering the (perceived) cost of travel for
the poor say by improving the public transport infrastructure, or as structural as mandating
nancial literacy training in secondary school curricula, or as radical as pro-actively countering
residential segregation by income say through the allocation of housing vouchers.
5 Conclusion
This paper has made three contributions to our understanding of the e¤ects of bank deregula-
tion on the spatial dynamics of branching, exploiting - much like a quasi-natural experiment -
the context of intense liberalization reforms in Belgium in the late nineties.
Using new panel data on branch dynamics (within the metropolitan area of Antwerp)
that we have collected from an archival source, our rst contribution was to assess whether
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the liberalization peak measurably a¤ected the dynamics of branch networks. We nd that
liberalization radically shifted and accelerated branch network dynamics (entries, exits and net
ows), and that these e¤ects were not only immediate, but also long-lasting.
Our second contribution was to investigate the inuence of the liberalization reforms on
bank choice for the everyday consumer. We nd that bank choice initiated a marked decline
between 1996 and 2001, which further continued over the ve-years thereafter.
Third, the immediate versus longer-term spatial ramications of the nancial sector liber-
alization were very distinct. Using new neighborhood-level measures of aggregate branch entry
and exit that we developed ourselves, we found that in the period coinciding with the liber-
alization peak, suddenly branches were signicantly more likely to exit poor neighborhoods
and enter their wealthier counterparts. Relatedly, the level change in nancial void spread un-
evenly during this period, that is, the poorer neighbourhoods experienced a sudden, signicant
increase in bank desert. The dynamics in the aftermath of the liberalization peak exhibited
no such systematic relationship with neighborhood income. Rather, they are consistent with
patterns of change in technological innovations, notably the penetration and rise of online
banking.
One limitation of the present study is its focus, due to data constraints, on the spatial
dimension of branching dynamics in relation to the neighborhoodssocio-demographic char-
acteristics alone. This focus removes the possibility to more directly assess the impacts of
liberalization reforms, mediated by changes in branch network dynamics, on household nance
and other consumer behaviours. Another limitation is that we do not have service price and
quality data by branch. It would be interesting to explore whether they vary with neigh-
borhood income, number of competing banks and distance to closest competitor. These are
interesting areas for future research.
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Appendix A: Regressions using bank counts
This appendix reports the results obtained by using the simple counts of banks instead of
the zonal statistic. Although the correlation among the two measures is quite high (see table
12), the results obtained using the simple count are overall much less signicant, as expected.
We reach this conclusion after estimating the model of equation 1 with two alternative
specications. The rst is a standard OLS, to ease comparability with the previous estimates.
The second one accounts for the fact that with count variables OLS are inconsistent, and -
also considering the large number of zeros present in the entry and exit variables - the most
appropriate econometric model is a Zero Inated Negative Binomial. In the latter case, the
number of exits and entries are regressed on all the variables of the regression reported in table
4, while the zeros are a function of the zonal statistic at the beginning of the period and the area
of the neighbourhood. The di¤erence in the bank count between the end and the beginning
of the period, instead, contains only few zeros; therefore, it has been linearly transformed to a
non-negative variable (by adding four to all the observations), and is regressed by means of a
Poisson model.
Results are reported in tables 13 and 14. In both the cases, the results obtained with the
simple counts of banks are clearly less signicant, which suggests that the dependent variable
is considerably less precise. This is particularly evident when the dependent variables are the
number of entries and exits (col. 2 and 3 of table 13 and col. 2 and 4 of table 14).
Table 12: Zonal statistic and bank counts: pairwise correlations
Pairwise correlation Zon. st. ow Zon. st. entry Zon. st. exit
 bank count 0.74
Entry count 0.66
Exit count 0.71
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Table 13: Regression of bank counts, OLS
(1) (2) (3)
COEFFICIENT  Bank count entry count exit count
Model OLS OLS OLS
Average income 1991 0.421 0.522 0.125
(0.61) (0.57) (0.25)
Average income 1996 1.231*** 0.236 -0.210
(0.45) (0.34) (0.31)
Average income 2001 0.666 0.300 -0.336
(0.43) (0.38) (0.41)
Zonal statistic -0.802*** 0.707*** 1.436***
(0.14) (0.11) (0.10)
Active/tot pop. 1991 1.059 1.961** 1.012
(1.33) (0.97) (1.07)
Active/tot pop. 1996 -3.054* -1.203 0.306
(1.58) (0.78) (0.91)
Active/tot pop. 2001 0.999 1.098 0.117
(1.31) (1.02) (1.12)
Tot. pop. (log) 0.0460 0.0479** 0.0234
(0.034) (0.023) (0.029)
non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 1.110 0.516 -0.650
(0.89) (0.78) (0.52)
non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 0.534 -0.185 -0.404
(0.86) (0.61) (0.66)
non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 -0.202 -0.329 -0.171
(0.98) (0.65) (1.03)
elderly/tot pop. 1991 2.345* 2.129* -0.0578
(1.25) (1.10) (0.83)
elderly/tot pop. 1996 0.0402 -0.788 -0.434
(1.30) (0.83) (0.87)
elderly/tot pop. 2001 1.026 0.691 -0.191
(0.99) (0.85) (0.92)
Centre dummy 0.103 0.0830 0.0360
(0.12) (0.096) (0.093)
Constant -3.692 -4.978 -1.666
(3.90) (3.76) (1.70)
Observations 699 699 699
R2 0.14 0.21 0.42
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
Time, district, and time-district dummies included in all the specications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 35
Table 14: Regression of bank counts, zero inated negative binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES  Bank count entry count inate exit count inate
Model Poisson ZINB ZINB ZINB ZINB
Average income 1991 0.112 1.482 0.531
(0.148) (1.243) (0.654)
Average income 1996 0.316*** 1.048 -0.424
(0.110) (1.433) (0.936)
Average income 2001 0.177 0.845 -0.727
(0.112) (0.777) (0.599)
Zonal statistic -0.219*** 0.902** -13.86** 1.388*** -13.67***
(0.0381) (0.408) (6.711) (0.175) (2.796)
active/tot pop. 1991 0.283 6.678** 3.007
(0.324) (3.161) (2.341)
Active/tot pop. 1996 -0.780* -4.285 3.343
(0.400) (3.768) (2.551)
Active/tot pop. 2001 0.280 2.468 1.279
(0.343) (3.407) (1.779)
Tot. pop. (log) 0.0128 0.293** 0.156*
(0.00836) (0.135) (0.0800)
non Belgian/tot pop. 1991 0.294 1.167 -0.744
(0.213) (2.371) (1.508)
non Belgian/tot pop. 1996 0.142 0.582 1.652
(0.206) (2.900) (2.005)
non Belgian/tot pop. 2001 -0.0532 -2.946 -0.281
(0.258) (2.368) (2.082)
elderly/tot pop. 1991 0.615** 6.987** 1.625
(0.297) (3.507) (2.268)
elderly/tot pop. 1996 0.0152 -0.452 3.042
(0.319) (3.584) (2.648)
elderly/tot pop. 2001 0.283 0.643 0.186
(0.260) (2.649) (1.678)
centre dummy 0.0277 0.390 0.118
(0.0314) (0.323) (0.204)
area 3.46e-07 -3.39e-07
(4.35e-07) (2.40e-07)
Constant 0.403 -17.82** 3.195*** -7.826** 3.317***
(0.944) (8.953) (1.102) (3.922) (0.792)
Observations 699 699 699 699 699
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
Time, district, and time-district dummies included in all the specications
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B: Spatial econometric models of desert and choice variables
In this appendix we report the results of the regressions based on spatial econometric models
of the specications we discussed in section 4.2. The models we estimate are the spatial error
and the spatial lag model described in section 4.1.4; to ease computation, we split the sample
by each period - this, however, a¤ects only the structure of the residuals and leaves unchanged
the point estimates, which are therefore fully comparable with the corresponding OLS results
reported in table 10. As it is possible to see in table 15, 16, and 17, the results do not change
the general picture obtained from the OLS estimates. In particular, in the second period
(1996-2001), the only one for which the coe¢ cients on income are signicant, the di¤erence in
the point estimates is minimal, especially as compared to the spatial lag model.
Table 15: Spatial regression desert and choice variables, 1991-1996
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT  dist 1st bank  dist 3 groups  dist 1st bank  dist 3 groups
Spatial model ERROR ERROR LAG LAG
Average income -3.165 16.67 -3.018 10.75
(12.4) (11.5) (10.5) (11.1)
Active/tot pop. 26.54 -20.48 24.25 -1.045
(27.3) (23.0) (27.4) (20.6)
Tot. pop. (log) -0.935 -0.399 -1.125 -0.802
(1.97) (2.94) (1.93) (2.77)
non Belgian/tot pop. -2.038 5.154 -7.943 -11.10
(18.4) (16.1) (19.2) (20.5)
elderly/tot pop. 1991 0.454 -38.38 -9.007 -48.77
(27.0) (27.8) (30.2) (32.3)
centre -3.618 -7.600 -1.384 -0.477
(3.33) (6.77) (2.49) (4.08)
Constant 28.98 -48.61 23.15 -41.79
(84.2) (59.8) (73.3) (73.1)
Observations 233 233 233 233
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: Spatial regression desert and choice variables, 1996-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT  dist 1st bank  dist 3 groups  dist 1st bank  dist 3 groups
Spatial model ERROR ERROR LAG LAG
Average income -10.66* -35.06*** -14.04** -34.34***
(5.71) (12.5) (5.48) (10.5)
Active/tot pop. -12.74 86.24 -19.17 37.88
(17.8) (56.3) (21.5) (44.3)
Tot. pop. (log) -1.120 -4.413** -1.555 -5.542**
(1.14) (2.14) (1.30) (2.27)
non Belgian/tot pop. -9.437 9.996 -17.52 0.975
(15.0) (28.7) (17.6) (27.0)
elderly/tot pop. 1991 -22.32 45.46 -31.04 15.64
(14.7) (50.8) (20.1) (45.7)
centre -1.279 1.292 -1.586 -0.0244
(3.54) (7.50) (2.85) (4.45)
Constant 81.43** 149.1** 106.8*** 200.0***
(35.2) (74.3) (38.6) (73.2)
Observations 233 233 233 233
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Spatial regression desert and choice variables, 2001-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COEFFICIENT  dist 1st bank  dist 3 groups  dist 1st bank  dist 3 groups
Spatial model ERROR ERROR LAG LAG
Average income -3.165 16.67 -3.018 10.75
(12.4) (11.5) (10.5) (11.1)
Active/tot pop. 26.54 -20.48 24.25 -1.045
(27.3) (23.0) (27.4) (20.6)
Tot. pop. (log) -0.935 -0.399 -1.125 -0.802
(1.97) (2.94) (1.93) (2.77)
non Belgian/tot pop. -2.038 5.154 -7.943 -11.10
(18.4) (16.1) (19.2) (20.5)
elderly/tot pop. 1991 0.454 -38.38 -9.007 -48.77
(27.0) (27.8) (30.2) (32.3)
centre -3.618 -7.600 -1.384 -0.477
(3.33) (6.77) (2.49) (4.08)
Constant 28.98 -48.61 23.15 -41.79
(84.2) (59.8) (73.3) (73.1)
Observations 233 233 233 233
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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